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Financial Regulations: Implications from Experiences 
in OTC Derivative Market Reform
Jutaro Kaneko†
is paper aims to explore possible measures to harmonize or coordinate national regulations better 
on cross-border nancial transactions, deriving empirical lessons from the ongoing discussion on over-
the-counter (OTC) derivative market reform, which has been one of the most important agenda at G-20 
meetings since 2009. Given that perfect convergence or standardization is not realistic at international 
fora, to eectively rely on other jurisdictions? regulatory regimes, existing approaches such as mutual rec-
ognition or substituted compliance need to be exercised on an outcome basis. Against this backdrop, the 
author advocates that deepening mutual understanding through closer communication among national 
regulators in charge is the key to avoiding or minimizing problems arising from extraterritoriality of do-
mestic rules going forward.
Introduction: International harmonization of nancial regulations
With the bitter and disastrous experiences in international trade and nancial transactions during 
the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s, there was a strong consensus among political and econom-
ic leaders on the need for international coordination and a rule-based logical and practical framework 
for international trade and nance, culminating in the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, which led 
to the establishment of the IMF and the IBRD, and imperfectly the GATT [Kitamura 2009: 187]. Un-
like areas such as competition and trade and telecommunication standards, international harmoniza-
tion of relevant national rules is an issue of political economy rather than an issue of law.
A treaty provides a legally-binding force consisting of more credible commitments between the sig-
natories. On the other hand, the ratication of a treaty is dicult, time consuming, and costly. As a re-
sult, formal legal obligations are most valuable when the potential for opportunism is high and the 
credibility of commitments is important [Verdier 2012: 17]. Besides, dispute resolution relying on 
judgment by court is basically not a suitable tool for matters related to nancial regulation. As long as 
the regulator is not content, the problem will remain as non-favored treatment by the regulator to-
wards the foreign nancial institution in its jurisdiction. To induce the regulator to amend its regula-
tion voluntarily is the key to successful resolution.
Against this backdrop, statutory agreements dominate in economic elds, resulting in more use of 
Journal of Asia-Pacic Studies (W seda University) No. 23 (June 2014)
† Director for Technical Assistance and International Cooperation, Financial Services Agency, Government of Japan (e au-
thor received his Ph.D. degree from Graduate School of Asia-Pacic Studies of Waseda University. e views expressed in this 
article are exclusively the author?s and are not related to those of the organization he belongs to.)
?     ?
Jutaro Kaneko
176
the terms ?agreement? and ?rules? rather than ?standardization? or ?standards? [Kitamura 2009: 187]. 
Verdier argues that international nancial regulation (IFR) relies not on treaties and organizations, but 
on ?so law? standards designed by informal networks of regulators, in sharp contrast with other inter-
national regimes such as trade. International Organization of Securities Commission?s (IOSCO?s) Mul-
tilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU), the Basel Concordat, and international accounting 
standards are widely recognized as successful example in this context. ese mechanisms which are 
usually known among academics as Transnational/Transgovernmental Regulatory Networks (TRNs),1 
and so law, dominate IFR, because they provide some incentives for compliance while preserving the 
benets of speed, exibility, and expertise [Verdier 2012: 2?4].
In most countries, the legislature delegates extensive authority to shape and enforce nancial regula-
tion to expert bureaucrats. While in the past this authority was oen exercised by a department of the 
executive branch, the more recent trend has been to delegate regulatory powers to the central banks or 
to create specialized independent agencies such as securities, banking and commodities commissions. 
ese specialized national regulators emerged as the primary actors in IFR.2 On the other hand, a set-
back of TRN is that since specialized regulators are not directly accountable for failures in areas where 
IFR performs poorly, and they prefer to preserve as much authority and discretion as possible, they 
have little incentive to strive for a more formal and binding IFR system.
Harmonization of cross-border regulations among individual jurisdictions, including the timing of 
implementation, is needed for the purpose of preventing regulatory arbitrage, decrease of international 
transactions and market segmentation, while ensuring a level playing eld and investor protection. Ex-
traterritoriality has oen been discussed in the context of rules concerning banking supervision by Ba-
sel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), bank resolution of nancial institutions and account-
ing standards.
e extraterritoriality of national regulations related to OTC derivatives is a relatively new issue, and 
it may be too early to try to derive rm lessons from the past discussions and experiences, given that 
the issue has not been addressed fully at the time of this writing, in late 2013. However, if the underly-
ing problem is not made clear now, a similar problem could arise in other nancial areas in the near 
future.
1 According to Verdier [2009: 118], TRNs are informal multilateral forums that bring together representatives from national 
regulatory agencies or departments to facilitate multilateral cooperation on issues of mutual interest within the authority of 
the participants. Verdier points out the following characteristics of TRN: their members are not states but specialized regula-
tory agencies; they are not created by treaty and have no international legal personality; they lack formal assemblies or voting 
procedures; the instruments they promulgate are not internationally binding; and, at least until recently, they do not systemat-
ically monitor or enforce compliance with those instruments. He also names the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
which is a forum for regulators and central bank governors, as the rst major TRN in nancial regulation. In addition, he 
names IOSCO and IAIS as TRNs [Verdier 2012: 12?14].
2 Verdier explains the reason for this as that under the postwar Bretton Woods monetary system, international capital mobility 
was expected to be strictly limited and, thus, there was no need for a formal institution to regulate private international -
nance, alongside the ones established for monetary aairs and trade. With no international framework to address them and 
no authority to create formal institutions or binding agreements, they instead created informal networks and non-binding 
standards. For better or worse, this approach remains the cornerstone of the current system [Verdier 2012: 4].
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International guidelines, including recommendations and principles, are not legally binding and do 
not require jurisdictions to amend their laws or regulations for compliance. ey can be ineective, 
subject to powerful domestic constituencies. ?Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures? (PFMIs) 
(http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss101a.pdf) published by Committee on Payments and Settlement System 
(CPSS) and IOSCO in April 2012 is most frequently referred to as such.
Similarly, IOSCO?s ?Principles regarding Cross-Border Supervisory Cooperation? (http://www.iosco.
org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD322.pdf) published in 2010 is the international guideline most re-
lied on with respect to cooperation issues among regulators. However, from a practical viewpoint, 
TRN is virtually binding through peer review and implementation monitoring by international orga-
nizations, such as Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) conducted by IMF and World Bank, 
as well as peer review conducted by Financial Stability Board (FSB).
Another advantage of so law agreements is that they are easier and faster to conclude, because they 
do not require cumbersome domestic ratication procedures. Since they are negotiated by experts 
rather than politicians, technical questions can be resolved based on shared expert knowledge. Since 
they are not legally binding, they provide exibility to adjust the obligations as circumstances change. 
So law works well for securities regulation because it provides speed, exibility and experience in reg-
ulating ever-changing markets.
On the other hand, treaties require the involvement of the ministry in charge of foreign aairs, 
which makes the process time consuming in some jurisdictions. A weak point of so law is that gov-
ernments could adopt a strategy of ?mock compliance??formally adopting the standards while ignor-
ing them in practice. As regards this argument, some advocate that IFR has signicant coercive power 
because pressures from markets and IFIs compel states to comply, and regulators wish to protect their 
reputation vis-à-vie their peers.
Implementation monitoring and assessment is based on the expectation of practical binding force 
through peer pressure and the ?name and shame? eect which arises from publication of assessment 
results. As Chris Brummer argues, so law can become more authoritative when combined with other 
costs such as reputational cost [Brummer 2012: 274]. e actual success of IFR initiatives depends on 
the respective interests and capabilities of these actors, which is the case when they have strong sup-
port from at least one, and passive acquiescence by the others in most circumstances. In this respect, 
the most dicult post-crisis challenges?tackling systemic risk and moral hazard?fall precisely in the 
area where IFR has historically performed poorly [Verdier 2012: 4?20].
e author explains in Chapter 1 what factors make OTC derivatives transactions so special as to re-
main frequently discussed agenda at the G-20 leaders? level and how the OTC derivatives regulatory 
reform has developed so far. Chapter 2 delineates the mechanism of how the mutual recognition works 
as the currently existing most practical approach to address cross-border issues. Chapter 3 aims to 
present implications derived from the international discussions on OTC derivatives regulatory reform 
and some possible way forward. In the conclusion, the author describes key messages and possible 
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measures to prevent the occurrence of similar lingering conicts among nancial regulators of the 
world to the extent possible.
1.?Characteristics of cross-border OTC derivatives transactions
Cross-border conicts can easily take place in the nancial world. A well-known example might be 
the case of an international bank resolution which oen crystalizes the home-host issue.?Of all the 
agendas taken up by the G-20 leaders aer the global nancial crisis, the most signicant and conten-
tious one has been OTC derivative market reform.
Derivatives are nancial instruments used for both risk management and speculation. Derivatives 
are an essential risk management tool for many rms. Without them, rms would be le without a 
method for hedging against risks beyond their control and would be discouraged for entering into eco-
nomically useful activities. Eliminating the use of derivatives would be akin to denying rms the right 
to acquire insurance on certain deals.
Given the cross-border nature, it is critical for regulators that a large portion of the derivatives trans-
actions has been dealt over the counter of the trading rms on a customized basis in accordance with 
individual risk proles of their clients, and not traded at exchanges. is makes it extremely dicult 
for regulators to grasp a global picture of OTC derivatives market conguration, and highly likely that 
they overlook the pile-up of exposures hidden from the public eye, to a fatal extent from the viewpoint 
of of managing systemic risks, which has been the most important mandate under globalization today.
e causes for the global nancial crisis of 2008 were complex and many. However, a commonly ac-
cepted ? and easy-to-follow ? narrative is that loan originators sold vast amounts or risky loans that 
were then repackaged (securitized) and sold o to the investors, who ? for one reason or another ? 
were unaware of the creditworthiness of the borrowers. e misuse of certain complex derivatives has 
been blamed for causing the nancial crisis by increasing the amount of risk in the nancial system 
and concentrating it in certain systemically important entities [Turner 2012: 398?402]. OTC derivative 
market reform is a notable example of jurisdictions rushing to develop new rules both without detailed 
international guidelines and without time for coordinating with each other.
Aer the global nancial crisis, G-20 leaders decided that OTC derivatives transactions should be 
traded either at exchanges or electronic trading platforms (ETPs), cleared by central counterparties 
(CCPs), and reported to trade repositories (TRs), with the aim of enhancing transparency, eliminating 
market abuse and mitigating systemic risk. Almost no jurisdiction had relevant rules at that time. At 
the G-20 Pittsburgh Summit in 2009, leaders committed to conducting OTC derivatives regulatory re-
form.3
Since then, G-20 countries have had to introduce new rules and amend existing ones under severe 
time constraints for coordination with other countries in a hasty manner. is resulted in the current 
3 For example, text of the G-20 leaders? statement is available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010?2014/president/pdf/
statement_20090826_en_2.pdf.
?     ?179
A Consideration on International Coordination of Financial Regulations
situation that some of the G-20 member jurisdictions have unique rules on the essential part of the 
G-20 commitment (e.g. mandatory clearing at CCPs) dierent from each other. For instances, law-
makers in the United States and Europe introduced two major pieces of legislation designed to harmo-
nize U.S. and European nancial regulations, including the regulation of OTC derivatives. ese were 
the U.S. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) and the Eu-
ropean Union?s so-called European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR).4
As a result, national laws and regulations developed in dierent directions. Due to the heavy burden 
of amending those rules once again, regulators are reluctant to change their own rules, and a deadlock 
situation is being observed, leaving the G-20 commitment unaccomplished. When applying its own 
rules in an extraterritorial manner, the regulator needs to coordinate with its counterpart regulators 
appropriately in terms of the scope of entity and product for application as well as the basic approach 
used. Against this backdrop, cross-border coordination or harmonization has always been one of the 
most discussed agenda at the G-20 Summit meetings, up to the latest one in St. Petersburg in Septem-
ber 2013.
As the former Chairman of the US SEC argues, a holistic approach to consider cross-border securi-
ties transactions was not needed from a practical viewpoint. In sharp contrast to that, the multi-trillion 
dollar OTC derivatives market became a signicant market well aer the advent of global trading? 
exploding in size over the last 20 years, operating relatively seamlessly across jurisdictions, and evolv-
ing largely without regulatory restraints. Today, cross-border derivative transactions are not the excep-
tion but the norm [Walter 2013].
erefore, once regulations are implemented across the major derivatives jurisdictions, the majority 
of derivatives transactions could be subject to multiple regulatory regimes. e potential for conict 
among those regimes is obvious. Facing the impending threat of contradictory rules, market partici-
pants have the ability to move or restructure their OTC derivatives activity with relative ease, avoiding 
more regulated markets, in search of less regulated ones.
Aer all, derivatives are contracts between counterparties?they need not be anchored to any partic-
ular geographic location or market. us, cross-border OTC derivative transactions are the norm. In 
fact, although other securities and nancial products are also traded beyond jurisdictions, the volume 
of OTC derivative traded on a cross-border basis is much bigger than those.5 Extraterritoriality is an 
issue caused by cross-border application of national rules. It is recognized that there are four types of 
forms problem can take as a result of extraterritoriality of national rules (see the box below).
Besides, the necessity to regulate the OTC derivatives transactions was sensed by policy makers and 
raised acutely and hastily. For instance, laws in the US and EU stipulate that cross-border OTC deriva-
tives transactions which have direct and signicant connection with their economies should be subject 
4 Kono [2013] delineates the initiatives taken by standard setting bodies, as well as eorts made by regulators of major OTC 
derivatives jurisdictions, to fulll the Pittsburgh G20 leaders? commitment on OTC derivatives market reform.
5 Data on transactions volume of OTC derivatives (notional principal basis only) is provided by the Bank for International 
Settlement and updated semi-annually and available at http://www.bis.org.
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to regulatory requirements. Once these rules are fully implemented, rms will not be able to conclude 
deals lawfully without consistency of corresponding rules among jurisdictions.
In order to address such a cross-border issue, regulators of relevant jurisdictions established an 
inter-agency forum named OTC Derivatives Regulators Group (ODRG) and has been reporting the 
outcome of its discussions to FSB and G-20 regularly.6 Regrettably enough, at the time of this writing, 
in late 2013, international concern on potential conicts, inconsistencies, overlaps and gaps of domes-
tic requirements remains substantial.7
For example, scopes of mandatory clearing at CCP are dierently stipulated in domestic laws and 
regulations from jurisdiction to jurisdiction with respect to the entity (e.g. branches of OTC deriva-
tives dealers) and product (e.g. commodity based derivatives), as well as registration/licensing require-
ments for dealers and market infrastructures including ETPs, CCPs and TRs. e same situation of 
diversication is the case with the timing of implementation of the relevant national rules.
Under these circumstances, legislative and regulatory uncertainty is beginning to have a negative in-
uence on international transactions of OTC derivatives. Out of the anxiety of breaching foreign regu-
lations unintentionally and getting punished by the competent foreign authority going forward, some 
international OTC derivatives rms have been reportedly refraining from making deals with foreign 
entities in certain jurisdictions.
6 Some of the reports to G-20 are available publicly on the websites of member regulators. e latest report at the time of this 
writing which is entitled ?Report on Agreed Understanding to Resolving Cross-border Conicts, Inconsistencies, Gaps and 
Duplicative Requirements? is available at http://www.cc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/le/odrgreport.
pdf, etc.
7 For information on the latest status of the issue at the time of this writing, see the above mentioned ODRG?s report to the 
G-20 and FSB OTC Derivatives Working Group?s (ODWG?s) progress report entitled ?OTC Derivatives Market Reforms?
Sixth Progress Report on Implementation?? (http://www.nancialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130902b.htm).
?     ?181
A Consideration on International Coordination of Financial Regulations
2.?Recognition of other jurisdiction?s rule
Tai-Heng Cheng acknowledges that international regulatory prescriptions are most likely to be eec-
tive when they do not require national policies to change [Cheng 2012: 198]. Given the great diver-
gence of international society which arises from particular situations each country faces, it is not prac-
tical to aim at a perfect convergence of national rules.
Rather, we should pay due respect to such dierences. In this regard, recognizing other jurisdiction?s 
rules as equivalent to own rules, as far as certain conditions are met, is perceived as the most practical 
approach at the present. Determination of equivalence or comparability of the counterpart?s rules is 
the key element for this tool. ere are some elements to be considered in this respect as described be-
low.
In a mutual recognition system, two or more states agree to recognize the adequacy of each other?s 
regulation as a substitute for their own. Accordingly, rms or activities that comply with their home 
state?s regulation may access the host state pursuant to an exemption from some or all of the host 
state?s regulatory requirements. Mutual recognition diers from harmonization, which involves a sys-
tematic eort to eliminate substantive dierences between countries? regulatory requirements, usually 
by amending them to conform to uniform international rules.
Instead, mutual recognition rests on an assessment that the home state?s regulation is ?equivalent? or 
?comparable? to that of the home state, and vice versa.8 Mutual recognition is oen referred to as ?sub-
stituted compliance? and is not a universally perfect solution, as originally advocated by high-ranking 
ocials of the US SEC [Tafara and Peterson 2007], but it provides the most practical mechanism to ad-
dress the cross-border issue of regulatory coordination in the current real world, which oen lacks a 
rm yard stick such as a treaty.
As Verdier maintains, mutual recognition is founded on a promise of reciprocal market access that 
may harness a constituency of nancial services ?exporters? to provide domestic political support for 
new agreements [Verdier 2011: 66]. In this regard, reciprocity based on the principle that one will rec-
ognize comparability of the other?s rules only to the extent the other recognizes the comparability is 
the key. is approach entails a process to compare dierent legal and regulatory systems in a compre-
hensive manner. us, it can be very time and resource consuming, especially when it is conducted 
parallel among more than three jurisdictions.
Although international principles fail to provide detailed guidelines due to its exible nature to be 
applied to various jurisdictions, they can be a high-level yardstick to be respected when conducting 
comparability assessment in an outcome-based manner. International standards such as 
CPSS-IOSCO?s PFMIs are oen very general in nature, and were not designed to cover all concerns a 
host state may have about matters. Obviously, however, insisting on identical regulation as a prerequisite 
to mutual recognition would make it tantamount to harmonization and defeat its purported benets.
8 Refer to Verdier [2011] for details on mutual recognition.
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Mechanical comparison of corresponding languages can only result in the determination of 
no-equivalence or comparability, which can force one of the concerned parties to change their 
ready-nalized national rules. Based on the recognition, Tafara and Peterson suggest that the assess-
ment is to be made at a more general level, emphasizing the similarity of objectives between the sys-
tems and comparisons of certain ?core? regulatory requirements [Tafara and Peterson 2007: 59?61]. 
Sometimes, it can be appreciated as a good eect of mutual recognition to promote regulatory compe-
tition, which may be a useful check on inecient national systems and allow individual states to serve 
as laboratories of regulatory innovation [Verdier 2011: 65?94].
However, there is no guarantee that such competition would be made in an appropriate manner, giv-
en the power gap among jurisdictions. Ultimately, what matters most for market participants is wheth-
er or not the equivalence of their home countries? rules concerned is determined by foreign authorities 
of the jurisdiction where they are doing business. In this context, the approach of mutual recognition 
is not useful especially to address the case of regulatory gaps, as it relies on the existence of similarity 
among regulations, if not identicalness.
In order to ll such gaps, competent authorities of each relevant jurisdiction need to adjust their do-
mestic rules to a common yardstick. Comparability assessment requires high level similarity between 
relevant regulatory regimes, and where such minimum similarity lacks, there may be no other choices 
than applying stricter rules for the purpose of avoid regulatory arbitrage.
Granting exemption is a form of substituted compliance or mutual recognition, as far as it is based 
on equivalence or comparability. As Professors Jerry Ellig and Houman Shadab have argued, mutual 
recognition agreements should be ?outcome-based.? Under this approach, domestic regulators would 
not focus on the similarity of regulatory prescriptions, but on whether foreign regulatory systems 
achieve comparable outcomes (e.g. investor protection). is approach has the benet of acknowledg-
ing that there is no one-size-ts-all solution to such complex problems as the cross-border issue on 
OTC derivative regulation [Ellig and Shadab 2009: 323].
Mutual recognition would permit regulators to agree only to basic, minimum standards, while 
adopting their own detailed answers to these and other questions to suit their domestic policy prefer-
ences and the demands of domestic constituents [Turner 2012: 422]. Although it is not within the 
scope of analysis of this article, it should be noted that the system of mutual recognition does not 
necessarily lead to the objectively desirable result of coordination, reecting the power balance among 
jurisdictions concerned (e.g. size of their domestic markets and political bargaining power).
3.?Towards better coordination among regulators
Regulators have been making strenuous eorts under the dicult circumstances that the global -
nancial crisis allowed the regulators little time for coordination among themselves when developing 
their rules on OTC derivative transactions. Nevertheless, the current situation leaves much to be de-
sired. ere is no such thing as a ?one-size-ts-all? approach to address this issue, due to economic, 
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political and social specicities in each jurisdiction.
For instance, regulators are independent of government in some jurisdictions and not in others. 
Some regulators are responsible only for investor protection and market integrity while others are re-
sponsible also for economic growth in a practical sense. Nevertheless, it does not exclude the room for 
regulators to learn frankly from each other for the ultimate regulatory goals of market integrity and in-
vestor protection in the global nancial markets.9 In this regard, it is benecial that regulators accept 
the best practices of their colleagues in other jurisdictions on a voluntary basis. e important factor 
to be considered is that regulators do not feel forced or pressed in any sense to change their own rules 
by others.
To establish a cooperative and even friendly relationship which enables regulators to know more 
about each other, including their entire legal and regulatory framework, is the prerequisite for such en-
hanced coordination among regulators. For this goal, it might be worthwhile considering to share with 
each other even failure experiences. Regulators could sometimes learn more from failure than success.
Realization of conicts which can result in the segregation of the global OTC derivatives market and 
a decrease of liquidity in the market is currently only avoided by time-limited relief, such as exemp-
tions of extraterritorial application or deferral of implementation, which is announced by no-action 
release of own rules. Under the circumstances there is little outlook for reaching agreement in a timely 
manner. However, such a measure can be nothing but a tentative solution to save time until an ulti-
mate solution is agreed.10 In practice, this was the only way to avoid realization of potential catastro-
phe.
On the other hand, there is a dilemma that it means a further delay of fulllment of the G-20 lead-
ers? commitment at Pittsburgh in 2009. Harmonization is costly, once rules are set in jurisdictions in 
such forms as statutes and acts. Someone must pay a high price for amending the laws or regulations, 
which entails a very tiring and time consuming process. us, it implies that the starting point is criti-
cal. Coordination and information sharing from the very early stage is the key to prevent extraterrito-
riality.
A contingency plan for nancial institutions needs to be developed as a back stop for the case that 
coordination among authorities doesn?t work. Coordination at a higher level seems indispensable. It 
9 In general, the most challenging task for regulators is to strike the proper balance between the twin objectives of ensuring the 
safety and soundness of the nancial system and of fostering the growth and development of the nancial markets. As for the 
latter, an unattractive market will cause the movement of nancial activity to other markets. In this regard, nancial markets 
are in competition with each other. Excess competition between nancial markets could bring about conicts of interest for 
regulators and, as a result, hamper cooperation among regulators from a bad viewpoint that supporting regulators in other ju-
risdictions would simply lead to losing relative dominance in your own market. As Pan points out, to the extent that national 
regulators operate independently of one another, they will always face competitive pressure and must be prepared to imple-
ment regulatory strategies that make their markets more attractive. If we believe such competition undermines the stability of 
our nancial markets through the ?race to the bottom? approach, the solution is to improve cooperation among national regu-
lators to minimize the dierences in national regulation and supervisory standards [Pan 2011: 800?812].
10 For instance, CFTC has decided to delay the application of its cross-border rules in July 2013. EC also delayed the deadline for 
ESMA?s technical advice on equivalence between EU regimes and those of other jurisdictions in June 2013. Other jurisdic-
tions are taking similar measures, including refraining from applying their rules cross-border.
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has already become an important political agenda and pressure from the ministerial level is needed to 
move things forward. However, it may not be eective enough, where some agencies are even indepen-
dent of the supreme leader of the jurisdiction they serve. From the realistic viewpoint, a combination 
of harmonization and other tools, including mutual recognition/substituted compliance and exemp-
tion is the only practical way forward, although it is far from a perfect solution.
In order for the comparability/equivalence assessment to be successful, relevant regulators should 
basically refrain from requesting legislative and regulatory changes from each other. In this regard, rel-
evant regulators need to communicate with each other very closely both at the institutional level and 
individual sta level through various channels. As regards the latter, frequent and in-depth exchange 
of views not only among high rank ocials of the relevant authorities but also among practitioners is 
very useful.
e outcome-based approach for equivalence/comparability assessment requires a deep understand-
ing of the ideas underlying each other?s regulatory regime, unlike the simple rule-by-rule comparison. 
A mutual secondment of sta in charge of planning regulations of OTC derivatives would be worth 
considering. Below are two measures the author nds most practical and eective to address 
cross-border regulatory conicts. In practice, there is no one-size-ts-all approach, and an eective ap-
proach could be dierent depending on individual situations. erefore, all possible combinations of 
all possible approaches should be tested to nd a globally consistent solution.
3.1?Stronger involvement of international standard setters
Discussions at international conferences of standard setting bodies (SSBs) and steering by SSB has 
been the main driving force to bring about agreement and to nd solutions to tough issues. Still, there 
may be some room le for wielding even stronger inuences. National regulators are increasingly co-
ordinating their actions through intermediary organizations designed to facilitate a higher level of 
multilateral action.
Examples include the BCBS, the IOSCO, the CPSS, and Committee on Global Financial System 
(CGFS). ese entities each provide a forum in which national regulators can interact and serve a vital 
function in the monitoring and appraising of member?s eorts to adopt relevant prescriptions. Coordi-
nating agencies accomplish their work by issuing best practices and standards, publishing expert re-
ports, and providing opportunities for information sharing and the coordination of enforcement 
across borders [Turner 2012: 410].
ere always exists a trade-o between respect for sovereignty and regulatory eciency and trans-
parency. e main drawback of informal agreements relative to treaties is that, since the reputational 
costs and enforcement mechanisms are weaker, informal commitments are less credible and less likely 
to constrain opportunism by states. However, states oen favor informal agreements in areas where 
uncertainly is high because they retain more exibility to modify the agreement in light of changed 
circumstances. States may choose to interact through networks in complex regulatory areas where 
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speed, expertise, and exibility are essential, and many issues can be addressed through simple coordi-
nation [Verdier 2009: 167?172].
SSBs may nd themselves in a better position also from the viewpoint of achieving the ultimate goal 
of international nancial society to serve fair and ecient market conditions, being free from political 
pressures (or under weaker pressure at least), given that coordination among national regulators can 
not ensure the optimal solution for the global nancial market as an entirety. Speediness/timeliness is 
the key in any sense. Desirably, international guidance should be published before jurisdictions decide 
their cross-border policies in order to avoid a backrush aerward.
Better representation of stake holders would be required. In the case of OTC derivatives market re-
form, the fact that the European Commission, which is responsible for the ultimate decision on equiv-
alence of other jurisdictions? legislative and regulatory regimes, is not a member of IOSCO, unlike 
European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA), might be pointed out as a reason why the SSB 
could not play a leading role in coordinating relevant national agencies in a direct manner. BCBS 
issued its ?Core Principles for Eective Banking Supervision? and IOSCO did its ?Objective and Principles 
of Securities Regulation?.
Needless to say, G-2011 is not a TRN; it is a political body made up of the national leaders (or minis-
ters and central bank governors) of the member states. However, it is not a formal international orga-
nization either. Like most of the existing TRNs, the G-20 does not have an international legal personal-
ity, its decisions are made by consensus, and they are not legally binding. But collectively its members? 
nancial regulators dominate the principal TRNs, and therefore the G-20 has the capacity to exercise 
an enormous inuence on IFR.
e top-down approach taken by the G-20 following the nancial crisis is an example of legal con-
vergence. Convergence, or harmonization, occurs when legal systems become more similar to one an-
other, usually through the deliberate adoption of policies. In international law, this approach is notable 
because it places the onus for implementing shared prescriptions on national governments, without 
formally obligating them to do so. In other words, the recommendations adopted by the G-20 at its re-
cent summits are just that: recommendations that member states can adopt or discard at their will.
G-20 reorganized the Financial Stability Forum, which was established by the G-7 in 1999, as the 
FSB, with a broader mandate and membership, including all G-20 members. Its mission is to coordi-
nate and oversee the work of other SSBs. e G-7 took over a more active and detailed priority-setting 
role for international nancial regulations. e G-20 was created at that time to give a voice to leading 
developing countries.
11 G-20 is an association of nance ministers and central bank governors from nineteen nations and the European Union whose 
origin lies in the nancial crisis of the late 1990s, which was created aer the Asian nancial crisis but played a marginal role, 
supplanted the G-7 as the principal forum for international economic cooperation. G-20 members meet periodically to confer 
on issues related to national policies, international cooperation, and international nancial institutions with the aim of sup-
porting growth and development across the globe. For further information on G-20, see ?What Is the G-20?? (http://www.g20.
org/index.php/en/what-is-the-g20).
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e G-20 is another example of an organization that plays a role in the formulation and promulga-
tion of so international law. Much of its work is carried out through the FSB. e FSB was created at 
the G-20?s London summit in 2009 with the mission to ?give momentum to a broad-based multilateral 
agenda for strengthening nancial systems and the stability of international nancial markets? through 
actions that include assessing member nations? nancial systems and regulatory structures, coordinat-
ing the exchange of information among members, and promoting necessary reforms.
e FSB is ?a network of networks? and also interacts with key organizations, including BCBS, 
IOSCO and CPSS. Among the FSB?s contributions to the G-20?s eorts is the issuing of progress 
reports on subjects, including reforms to the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets [Turner 2012: 
410]. Basically, G-20 is not a proper stage to discuss technical issues in the nancial area, but could 
further work as an entity which can add political pressure to international negotiations among regula-
tors and expedite them when there is little progress being made by regulators themselves.
3.2?Improving communication between regulators
Above all, dialogue is needed among regulators. In order to assess the comparability or equivalence 
on an outcome basis in a holistic manner, which means that some minor incomparability could be ig-
nored when determining equivalence, it is essential for regulators to develop mutual understanding. In 
this respect, the best teacher is the counterparty regulator. In other words, a lack of a deep understand-
ing of each other?s regulations tends to end up with supercial equivalence assessment on a rule-by-
rule basis as an easy solution.
In reality, the great economic powers disproportionately inuence outcomes. us, interstate power 
relationships also matter to IFR. ey are reluctant to support the creation of binding international stan-
dards and centralized institutions, because a more fragmented system allows them to wield their power 
more freely and achieve their objectives by shiing the issue to the most favorable forum [Verdier 2012: 
22?29]. As is oen argued by academics, uniform prudential standards only succeed when several major 
jurisdictions face similar crises at the same time, and are willing and able to compel others to join.
Regulators have been exchanging views through various channels, including email, phone and mail, 
as well as in-person meetings. Still, more frequent regular meetings among principals of relevant regu-
lators would be useful. In this respect, the central bank community is in an advanced position with re-
spect to the frequency of top level meetings. ere are a lot of similarities between central banks and 
regulators, especially in activities such as rule-making. But, roughly speaking, central banks are freer 
in nature than regulators, which are more restrained by laws and own regulations.
In the central bank society, Bank for International Settlement (BIS) located in Basel serves as a hub for 
communication. BIS hosts two principal bimonthly meetings: Global Economy Meeting, which com-
prises the governors from 30 BIS member central banks in major advanced and emerging market econ-
omies that account for about four hs of global GDP, and All Governors? Meeting, which comprises 
the governors of the BIS?s 60 member central banks (BIS 2013: 83?84). ese regular meetings among 
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central bank governors can be a model for regulators with respect to regularity and frequency at least.
As such, securities regulators set up a high-level meeting of ODRG in 2011. But ODRG meetings 
have not been so frequent and only on an ad-hoc basis so far [ODRG 2013]. To regularize meetings 
among principal regulators could be a rst step to enhance communication among OTC derivatives 
regulators. IOSCO adopted MMoU in 2002 for the purpose of strengthening cross-border assistance. 
All IOSCO members are expected to sign the MMoU, which requires prior screening to ensure that 
they have in place the necessary domestic authority to comply with assistance requests. e supervi-
sory MoU relies on the signatories? supervisory regime and is useful in ensuring enforcement.
Regulation is closely linked to supervision activities over nancial institutions on compliance with 
relevant rules, including regulations. Regulators also conduct supervision in many cases. PFMs? Re-
sponsibility E stipulates cooperation among authorities, including regulators. But, it provides too little 
additional guidance on cross-border cooperation for practical use.
Conclusion
e lessons the author derived from the OTC derivatives market reform could be summarized as 
follows:
a) a.? jurisdictions should coordinate with each other before nalizing their own national rules; and
 b.? regulators should have a profound understanding of the philosophy of corresponding legal 
and regulatory frameworks in other jurisdictions.
Based on the above basic ndings, measures which the author advocates to be taken are:
b) a.? IFRs develop international standards as quickly and in as much detail as possible; and
 b.? jurisdictions establish and maintain an eective mechanism for close communication, includ-
ing personnel exchange, based on written agreements, such as MoU (Memorandum of Under-
standing) and MoC (Memorandum of Cooperation).
In the case of coordination of nancial rules, it is more important to reach an outcome relevant au-
thorities can mutually agree with than winning a case at court, from the viewpoint of protecting na-
tional interest. e reason behind this is that one?s nancial institution could be bullied by the foreign 
regulators abroad at the end of the day, if they are not content with the judgment.
No mechanism can solve any problem by itself. How can eectiveness and eciency of the mecha-
nism be ensured? More specically speaking, how could the outcomes of regulations be compared? 
Unfortunately, we are not living in a perfect world, and without reliable statistics on OTC derivative 
transactions that are expected to be reinforced through further development of TRs and their data dis-
semination system to enable acquisition of the global picture of dispersion of exposure, it is technically 
close to impossible to seize the outcomes of regulations in a quantitative manner.
From a practical perspective, all alternatives would be tried for breakthrough of dead-lock situa-
tions. While discussing the overall direction of convergence at SSB, jurisdictions concerned are expect-
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ed to negotiate on a bilateral or multilateral basis, using the method of mutual recognition based on 
equivalence or comparability. In any case, the key is that relevant regulators communicate with each 
other very closely through meetings both at a high-level and sta level. Given that the outcome-based 
approach for equivalence/comparability assessment requires a good understanding of the ideas under-
lying each other?s regulatory regime, contrary to a simple rule-by-rule comparison, intense exchange 
of views on a regular and frequent basis is essential.
At the end of the day, repetitive and patient dialogues among regulators are the only practical solu-
tion for this extremely complex problem. Mutual trust is the key word in this respect. Unlike a 
mechanical comparison of corresponding languages, an outcome-based equivalence determination 
requires a profound understanding of the counterparties? legal and regulatory regimes.
From a practical viewpoint, no regulatory agency in the world has enough resources to scrutinize 
other jurisdictions legal and regulatory systems thoroughly. Otherwise, such process as equivalence as-
sessment could easily be self-righteous or excessively dogmatic. In this regard, close and perpetual 
communications among regulators at various levels are indispensable to ensure reliable information 
sharing, which only enables fair assessment of others? regimes. Close and long-term relationships 
among regulators are the source of the practical binding force and have the most eective deterrence 
power against extraterritoriality that other jurisdictions can not accept.
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